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Abstract
We derive, by using the revealed preference method, an individual decision making
model that allows for an agent not only to exhibit status quo bias, but also to make
use of her default option as a reference point. The resulting model contains elements
of the classical rational choice model — indeed it reduces to that model in the case of
choice problems without default options — but can also be viewed as arising from a
basic choice procedure that involves multiple objectives. Another important feature of
the model is that, while it permits status quo bias, it does not necessarily lead to the
overvaluation of one’s endowment, and hence it is duly consistent with the absence of
a gap between one’s willingness to sell and buy a given choice alternative.
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11 Introduction
A large number of empirical studies, both within economics and psychology, have established
that decision makers settle various types of choice problems in a reference-dependent manner.
In particular, there is now a widespread agreement among both behavioral economists and
rational decision theorists that individuals behave in the same choice situation markedly
diﬀerently, depending on what sort of a “reference” they are given in the form of an initial
entitlement, endowment and/or default option. Indeed, in a plethora of experimental and
ﬁeld studies, the relative value of an alternative is found to be accentuated for agents who
possess that alternative as current endowment. (Following Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988),
this eﬀect is called the status quo bias phenomenon.) Moreover, it is well established that
the status quo position of a decision maker aﬀects the behavior of the agent even if the agent
chooses to move away from her status quo (as in reason-based decision making, or what is
called the attraction eﬀect).1
However, the basic nature of reference-dependent decision making is not well understood.
For instance, a good part of the experimental literature assumes that status quo bias phe-
nomenon is tantamount to the so-called endowment eﬀect (Thaler, 1980) which maintains
that the minimum compensation demanded by an agent for a good that she owns is less
than the maximum price she is ready to pay for the same good. In fact, as we demonstrate
below, status quo bias (properly deﬁned) does not entail the endowment eﬀect. Moreover,
it turns out that the endowment eﬀect is suspect as a behavioral trait, at least in the case
of experienced traders. Indeed, there is now good evidence that shows that this eﬀect is
likely to dissipate with market experience, and there need not be a gap between willingness
to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP).2 To be sure, this does not mean traders,
1The empirical/experimental literature on reference-dependent individual decision making is too large to
be cited here. We refer the reader to Camerer (1995) and Sugden (1999) for insightful surveys on this matter.
For discussions of the attraction eﬀect and related phenomena, see Simonson (1993), Shaﬁr, Simonson and
Tversky (1993), Sen (1998), Malaviya and Sivakumar (2002), and references cited therein.
2See, for instance, Shogren et al. (1994) and List (2003, 2004). In a more recent study, Plott and
Zeiler (2005, pp. 532 and 542) summarize their experimental ﬁndings in complete accordance with this
position: “When an incentive-compatible mechanism is used to elicit valuations, and subjects are provided
with (a) a detailed explanation of the mechanism and how to arrive at valuations; (b) paid practice using the
mechanism; and (c) anonymity, we observe no WTA-WTP gap. ... The primary conclusion reported here
is that (previously) observed WTA-WTP gaps do not reﬂect a fundamental feature of human preferences.
2experienced or otherwise, do not use their initial entitlements as reference points. Instead,
it shows that the nature of reference dependent choice is less straightforward than what one
may initially surmise.
One major diﬃculty in this branch of literature is the lack of a canonical model within
which a formal discussion can be conducted. Indeed, none of the few proposed models are
general enough to serve for this purpose, for most of these models are couched within the
particular setup of certain types of experiments, as opposed to being a general model of
individual decision making. (This is, of course, in sharp contrast with the classical rational
choice theory.) Consequently, these models either necessitate the presence of the endowment
eﬀect, or concentrate on only one aspect of the eﬀe c to fo n e ’ se n d o w m e n ta c t i n ga sar e f e r e n c e
point.3 In addition, more often than not, their foundational bases are suspect.
The main objective of the present paper is to develop an individual choice model which
is free of the diﬃculties that surround the available models of reference-dependent choice.
We follow an axiomatic approach that builds on classical revealed preference theory. First,
we posit rationality axioms on choice behavior (for problems in which the agent may or may
not have a status quo option) along the guidelines of standard choice theory. Second, we
introduce a basic status quo bias axiom, and hence depart from the classical rational choice
paradigm in a way that is consonant with related experimental ﬁndings. Finally, we advance
two further properties that “control” the extent of reference dependence the sought model
allows for. It is found that these behavioral (and hence directly testable) postulates lead to
an individual decision making model that is based on a basic procedure.
Loosely speaking, the procedural structure of this model can be summarized as follows.
If the choice problem of the agent has a status quo (default) option, then she makes her
choices upon maximizing a utility function U. (See Figure 1.a.) If there is a status quo, say
x, in the problem, she uses the following procedure:
Step 1. The agent employs a mental “constraint set” that depends on her status quo,
say Q1(x), and eliminates (in her mind) all feasible alternatives that do not belong to this
constraint set.4 If, other than the default option x, at least one feasible alternative passes
That is, endowment eﬀect theory does not seem to explain observed gaps.”
3In Section 2, we brieﬂy consider the two main strands of models that are considered in the literature on
reference-dependent behavior, and point to the fundamental deﬁciencies of these approaches.
4One may think of Q1(x) as arising from a psychological phenomenon according to which the presence of
the status quo point x, acting as a reference, leads the agent to concentrate only on those alternatives that
3this test, then the agent chooses among such alternatives the ones that yield the highest
satisfaction in terms of her utility function U. (See Figure 1.b.) Otherwise, she moves to the
next stage of her procedure.
Step 2. At this stage, the agent reasons exactly as she did in the ﬁr s ts t a g e ,e x c e p tn o w ,
perhaps realizing that she made an “overuse” of her default option x as a reference point,
she relaxes her mental constraint set to a bigger set Q2(x).5 She settles her problem, then,
upon searching for feasible alternatives in Q2(x). If at least one of her options passes this
test, among these, those with the highest U value constitute her set of choices. (See Figure
1.c.) If no feasible alternative passes this second test either, then the agent chooses not to
move from her status quo point x. (See Figure 1.d.)
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
There are several advantages of this model. It is a boundedly rational choice model, to
be sure, but the departure from the rational choice model that it envisages emanates solely
from reference dependence, as the model reduces to the standard choice model for problems
without initial entitlements. It exhibits a deﬁnitive status quo bias – one of its deﬁning
axioms is, after all, a formalization of such a bias. But one can show that it allows for the
absence of the endowment eﬀect, so it is arguably suitable for modeling experienced as well
as nonexperienced traders. Moreover, it is based on a well-deﬁned procedure, and hence lies
within the realms of both reference-dependent and procedural choice. (In fact, as we show
below, one can also view this model as one of multicriteria choice.) Finally, this model is
directly testable in that it is given here a foundational basis in terms of simple behavioral
postulates.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide a quick overview of the literature
on reference-dependent choice, and point to the deﬁciencies of the models proposed in this
body of work. We then sketch in Section 3 our axiomatic framework, delineating carefully
are better than x in some (subjectively) unambiguous sense. Alternatively, one may think of the elimination
of those feasible alternatives outside Q1(x) as a “simpliﬁcation” the agent uses to settle her possibly complex
choice problem.
5By way of interpretation, we can think of the agent as allowing for more trade-oﬀs at Step 2, and hence
relaxing her reference-dependence somewhat. Another interpretation is that she concludes from the outcome
of Step 1 that using Q1(x) to eliminate alternatives may have “oversimpliﬁed” her problem, thereby adopting
a less restrictive rule of elimination.
4the behavioral basis of our choice postulates. Section 4 presents our characterization of the
procedural choice model discussed informally above, and Section 5 relates this model to the
theory of multicriteria decision making. Finally, in Section 6, we examine the standing of our
model relative to the endowment eﬀect, and show that it is consistent with both the absence
and presence of a gap between one’s WTA and WTP. Section 7 concludes, and Section 8
outlines the proofs of the main results.
2 Review of Reference-Dependent Choice Models
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the two basic approaches towards modeling individual choice
behavior in the presence of status quo or reference alternatives. We intend to show the need
for further theoretical work in this area, thereby clarifying the contribution of the present
investigation (or its lack thereof).6
2.1 The Loss Aversion Model(s)
The prototypical example of loss aversion models is the one introduced by Tversky and
Kahneman (1991) in the context of riskless choice.7 Indeed, this model is viewed within
the behavioral economics literature as the “standard” model of reference-dependent decision
making. It is couched in a framework where the objects of choice have multiple, say n ≥ 2,
dimensions, and all of these dimensions are observable. It is thus particularly suitable to
study decisions of individuals over all possible bundles of n goods – indeed, this is primarily
how the model is used in practice.
The basic premise of the Tversky-Kahneman model is that an agent, whose initial enti-
tlement is some x ∈ Rn
+, chooses those alternatives from a given feasible subset of Rn
+ upon
maximizing a utility function Ux : Rn
+ → R of the following form:
Ux(y): =
n X
i=1
ui(yi − xi). (1)
6We concentrate exclusively on works in which one’s reference is modeled exogenously as her (observable)
initial holdings and/or default option. Equally interesting is, of course, the case where one’s reference is not
observable, such as one’s aspirations, as in the work of Köszegi and Rabin (2006). We have little to say
about that type of reference dependence in the present paper, however.
7See Sugden (2003) for a version of this model within the context of choice under uncertainty.
5Here, for each i, ui : R → R is a continuous and strictly increasing function that satisﬁes the
following two properties:
(1) ui(0) = 0 and ui(t) < −ui(−t) for each t 6=0 ;
(2) ui|R+ is concave and ui|R− is convex.
Property (1) captures the phenomenon of loss aversion which says that, in terms of the
ith commodity, a gain is less important to the agent than a loss of equal size. In turn,
Property (2) says that the marginal value of both gains and losses are decreasing, and hence
corresponds to the so-called diminishing sensitivity eﬀect.
The implications of this model is found to be consistent with most experiments in which
the presence of an “initial entitlement” of an agent aﬀects her choice behavior. Moreover,
it has a particularly simple mathematical structure that makes it amenable to applications,
which is surely an appealing property.
Notwithstanding its incipient popularity, however, there are several diﬃculties that sur-
round this model. First of all, it is not a “basic” choice model in that it does not apply in
a straightforward manner to individual choice problems in which the objects of choice are
not consumption bundles. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to see how to make use of the model, say,
in the context of voting over political candidates, choosing between insurance or retirement
policies, comparing job oﬀers, etc..8
The Tversky-Kahneman model is thus best situated within the context of consumption
decisions alone. Considering, in addition, the fact that this model is based on an “additive
aggregation” hypothesis, it becomes transparent that it cannot serve as a canonical model
of reference-dependent choice.
Another diﬃculty with the Tversky-Kahneman model stems from the fact that, even in
8A somewhat typical response to this, say, in the context of job oﬀers, is that every “job contract” is a
multidimensional object – the dimensions being, for instance, work location, salary, job quality, etc. – and
hence, once the dimensions are speciﬁed, the Tversky-Kahneman model becomes applicable to the context of
job search. The diﬃculty here is that these dimensions are not observable, simply because which dimensions
are rendered relevant to the problem is known only to the decision maker. Furthermore, even when they are
prespeciﬁed, these dimensions need not be quantiﬁable, so one has to view x in this context as the “utility
proﬁle” that the agent derives from her current job. In turn,y i−xi corresponds to the gain/loss of utility (of
switching from x to y) with respect to the ith dimension. This leads one to subscribe to unacceptably strong
cardinality-of-utility assumptions just to be able to view yi−xi as a meaningful expression, and surely makes
the quantity ui(yi − xi) rather diﬃcult to interpret. (Other loss aversion models proposed in the literature,
such as that of Munro and Sugden (2003), suﬀer as well from the same shortcoming.)
6the context of choosing among consumption bundles, not all of its implications are in concert
with empirical facts. Indeed, this model deviates from the standard rational choice paradigm
to the extent that certain reasonable implications of the latter are lost. In particular, and as
nicely demonstrated by Munro and Sugden (2003), the Tversky-Kahneman model permits
choice cycles in the sense that, according to this model, an agent may strictly prefer y to
x when endowed with x, and strictly prefer z to y when endowed with y, and ﬁnally, x to
z when endowed with z). Needless to say, it would be unreasonable to expect a consumer
to depict such cyclical patterns in daily discourse, and indeed, there is no known market
evidence to this eﬀect.9
Finally, we note that the Tversky-Kahneman model is not consistent with the absence
of a gap between willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP).10 At ﬁrst,
this may seem like a strong point of the theory in that there are many “endowment eﬀect”
experiments that show that the minimum compensation demanded by an agent for a good
that she owns is often less than the maximum price she is ready to pay. However, as we have
noted in Section 1, careful empirical studies have shown that it may be a mistake to consider
the WTA-WTP gap as a fundamental feature of individual preferences, and one that goes
away with suﬃcient market experience. Of course, this does not mean that the preferences
of (experienced) traders are not reference-based or status quo biased. Instead, it shows that
a model that necessarily implies a gap between WTA and WTP may well leave something
to be desired.11
9Such cycles are permitted by the Tversky-Kahneman theory because the diminishing sensitivity eﬀect
(for losses) may act counter to the loss aversion eﬀect. If the former is eliminated, that is, if we consider
the constant loss aversion version of the model (in which each ui|R+ and ui|R− are assumed to be linear
functions), then no choice cycles may occur. But, unfortunately, the explanatory power of the constant loss
aversion model is nowhere near that of the Tversky-Kahneman model (cf. Masatlioglu and Uler, 2006).
10This claim is formalized in Section 6.2.
11To give an example, List (2004, pp. 616 and 624) summarizes the ﬁndings of his ﬁeld experiment within
the sportscard market as follows: “An interesting ﬁnding is that individual trading rates of inexperienced
consumers are consonant with predictions from prospect theory. The endowment eﬀect anomaly is not
universal, however: consumers that have signiﬁcant market experience do not exhibit behavior consistent with
prospect theory: rather, their behavior is in line with neoclassical predictions. ... The overall data pattern
observed uncovers important successes and failures of the theoretical literature, and provides challenges for
both neoclassical and reference-dependent theorists.”
72.2 The Multicriteria Choice Model(s)
Of more recent origin than the loss aversion models are choice models in which reference-
dependence of an individual is captured by means of multiple rationales. To give an exam-
ple, and for drawing comparisons later, we consider here the model that was introduced in
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).12 That model posits that a decision maker evaluates all choice
alternatives in some grand choice space X according to multiple, say m ≥ 2 many, criteria.
Suppose the preferences of the agent over alternatives in X with respect to criterion i is
represented by some utility function ui : X → R. Now, if the agent does not have a default
(status quo) option, then she chooses from a given feasible set those alternatives that max-
imize a utility function U : X → R. Here U is obtained through some aggregation of the
objectives u1,...,um (that is, U(ω)=f(u1(ω),...,um(ω)) for each ω ∈ X, where f : Rm → R
is a strictly increasing (aggregation) function.) If, on the other hand, the agent has a status
quo choice in the problem, say x ∈ X, then she proceeds to settle that problem by com-
paring every feasible alternative with x with respect to all criteria. I fn o n eo ft h ef e a s i b l e
alternatives y dominates x with respect to all objectives – that is, for any feasible y, there
is a rationale i such that ui(x) >u i(y) – then the agent chooses to stay with her status
quo. If, however, at least one feasible alternative “beats” x with respect to all objectives,
then the agent concentrates (only) on such alternatives, and chooses among them the one(s)
that yield the highest satisfaction in terms of the reference-independent utility function U.
This choice model relates closely to those suggested by Simon (1955) and Bewley (1986),
it reduces to the standard model of rational choice for problems without status quo, and is
fully consistent with the status quo bias phenomenon.13 Moreover, unlike the loss aversion
model(s), it is universal (in the sense that it applies to any choice situation), it forbids
cyclical choice patterns, and it is consistent with both the presence and absence of a gap
between WTA and WTP. Yet, it would surely be a mistake to deem this model superior to
the Tversky-Kahneman model. After all, the said Masatlioglu-Ok model fails to capture the
notion of reference-dependence beyond what is entailed by the status quo phenomenon. The
following example illustrates the nature of the diﬃculty.
Example 1. Consider an agent whose problem is to choose among feasible consumption
12See Houy (2006) and Sagi (2006) for related choice models.
13The results obtained in the experiments of Masatlioglu and Uler (2006) show that this model ﬁts the
data signiﬁcantly better than the constant loss aversion model.
8bundles (with two distinct commodities). Consider Figure 2, and suppose the initial en-
dowment of the agent is x, and that this agent chooses y from the set {x,x0,y,z}. Now
c o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ei n i t i a le n d o w m e n to ft h ea g e n ti sx0. The model outlined above
necessitates that the agent choose in this case y as well. (For, this model maintains that
“worsening” of one’s unchosen endowment cannot aﬀect the ﬁnal choice(s) of the agent.)
Am o m e n t ’ sr e ﬂection, however, shows that it is not at all unreasonable for the decision
maker to choose instead z in this situation. After all, it is quite conceivable that z looks
much better when one looks at the situation “from x0,”s oi ft h eu t i l i t yo fy is only slightly
higher than that of z, reference-dependence of the agent may easily lead her to choose z from
{x,x0,y,z} where her reference point is x0.14 ¤
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
This example illustrates that, despite its appealing features, the model of Masatlioglu
and Ok (2005), among other multicriteria choice models, falls short of being a satisfactory
model of “reference-dependent” decision making.
2.3 Synopsis
While it is far from being a comprehensive survey, the discussion above nevertheless highlights
the fact that the literature on reference-dependent choice is far from mature. In particular,
it lacks a rational choice model which (1) allows for the status quo bias phenomenon; (2)
reduces to the standard rational choice model in the case of problems with no explicitly
given reference points; (3) is free from cyclical choice patterns; (4) is consistent with both
the presence and absence of a gap between WTA and WTP; and (5) permits reference-
dependent decision making in ways that go beyond the status quo bias phenomenon.
Last, but not least, the said literature does not contain any model that could properly be
thought of as “procedural,” despite the obvious plausibility of such choice behavior (especially
in contexts where reference alternatives are explicitly designated). In the rest of the paper,
we conduct a decision-theoretic analysis towards “deriving” a procedural choice model that
14Indeed, the experiments of Masatlioglu and Uler (2006) show that such sort of reference-dependence is
quite common. Of course, given the strong empirical support for “reason-based choice,” this is only to be
expected.
9satisﬁes all of the criteria outlined above.
3 Rational Choice with Status Quo Bias
3.1 The Basic Framework
We designate an arbitrary compact metric space X to act as the universal set of all mutually
exclusive alternatives. The set X is thus viewed as the grand alternative space, and is kept
ﬁxed throughout the exposition. The members of X are denoted as x,y,z, etc.. For reasons
that will become clear shortly, we designate the symbol ♦ to denote an object that does not
belong to X. We shall use the symbol τ to denote a generic member of X ∪ {♦}.
We let ΩX denote the set of all nonempty closed subsets of X.B yachoice problem,
we mean a list (S,τ) where S ∈ ΩX and either τ ∈ S or τ = ♦. The set of all choice problems
is denoted as C(X).
Given any x ∈ X and S ∈ ΩX with x ∈ S, t h ec h o i c ep r o b l e m(S,x) is called a choice
problem with a status quo. The interpretation is that the individual is confronted with
the problem of choosing an alternative from the feasible set S while either she is currently
e n d o w e dw i t ht h ea l t e r n a t i v ex or her default option is x. Viewed this way, choosing an
alternative y ∈ S\{x} means that the subject individual gives up her status quo x and
switches to y. We denote by Csq(X) the set of all choice problems with a status quo.15
On the other hand, many real-life choice situations do not have a natural status quo
alternative. Within the formalism of this paper, the choice problems of the form (S,♦)
model such situations. Formally, then, we deﬁne a choice problem without a status quo
as the list (S,♦) for any set S in ΩX. (While the use of the symbol ♦ is clearly redundant
here, it will prove quite convenient in the foregoing analysis.)
By a choice correspondence on C(X) in the present setup, we mean a map c : C(X) →
15The restriction x ∈ S in the deﬁnition of the problem (S,x) is mildly restrictive. It disallows, for instance,
choice problems in which the agent must move away from her status quo point. (To wit, consider job-search
of an agent who is just ﬁred of her current job.) The only related study that (we know and) allows for x not
to belong to S in the deﬁnition of a choice problem with a reference point is Rubinstein and Zhou (1997).
That study however, works within an entirely diﬀerent context than ours, and hence utilizes a structure that
is unsuitable for a theory of choice with status quo and/or reference eﬀects.
10ΩX such that
c(S,τ) ⊆ S for all (S,τ) ∈ C(X).
(Notice that a choice correspondence on C(X) must be nonempty-valued by deﬁnition.)
3.2 Rational Choice
We now recall the basic rationality properties imposed on choice correspondences in the
classical theory of revealed preference. These properties allow one to identify when a “choice”
can be viewed as an outcome of a (well-behaved) utility maximization exercise. The most
well-known of such properties is the famous weak axiom of revealed preference (also known
as Arrow’s choice axiom (Arrow (1959)). As is standard in the related literature, we present
this axiom here as partitioned into two parts.
α-Axiom. For any (S,τ),(T,τ) ∈ C(X) with T ⊆ S,
y ∈ c(S,τ) and y ∈ T imply y ∈ c(T,τ).
β-Axiom. For any (S,τ),(T,τ) ∈ C(X) and z ∈ T,
y,z ∈ c(S,τ) and y ∈ c(T,τ) imply z ∈ c(T,τ).
Either of these properties condition the behavior of a decision maker across two choice
problems with identical status quo structure. In this sense, they are merely reﬂections of
the classical weak axiom of revealed preference.
The next rationality property that we consider here obtains as a simple modiﬁcation of
the β-Axiom.
β
∗-Axiom. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X), T ∈ ΩX, and z ∈ T,
y,z ∈ c(S,x) and y ∈ c(T,♦) imply z ∈ c(T,♦).
In words, this property says the following: If two alternatives are declared “equally
good” in a given choice problem with a status quo, this must be because these alternatives
are equally good in an objective sense, so they should also be deemed “equally good” in
choice problems without a status quo. Needless to say, this property is a necessary condition
11for behavior which is couched in terms of a utility maximization exercise: If two alternatives
y and z are both deemed “optimal” in a given choice problem, then the agent must be
indiﬀerent between y and z.
The ﬁnal property we state here is a reﬂection of the standard continuity property for
choice correspondences. It is a condition that ensures that the choices of an individual for
“similar” choice problems are “similar.” (Of course, it is trivially satisﬁed when X is ﬁnite.)
Upper Hemicontinuity (UHC). (a) For any S,Sm ∈ ΩX,m=1 ,2,..., if ym ∈ c(Sm,♦)
for each m, ym → y for some y ∈ X, and Sm → S (with respect to the Hausdorﬀ metric),
then y ∈ c(S,♦).
(b) For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X), if (ym) is a sequence in X\{x} such that ym ∈ c(S∪{ym},x)
for each m, and ym → y for some y ∈ X, then y ∈ c(S ∪ {y},x).
All four of the properties considered above are “normative” postulates, anyone of which
has a counterpart in the classical theory of rational choice. Mainly for expositional reasons,
we thus call a choice correspondence that satisfy these properties as “rational” in this paper.
Deﬁnition. A choice correspondence c on C(X) is said to be rational, if it satisﬁes UHC
and the α-, β-a n dβ
∗-Axioms.
Due to the richness of the present choice domain (which we owe to the presence of default
options), the class of rational choice correspondences is quite large, and in fact, include choice
models that can be viewed as boundedly rational at best. Uncovering such choice models that
deviate from the classical paradigm in order to conform with certain experimental regularities
is the main objective of the present investigation.
3.3 Status Quo Bias
The primary “descriptive” axiom that we are concerned with here derives from the phe-
nomenon that “an alternative is more likely to be chosen when it is the default option of a
decision maker.” The following postulate is an ordinal formulation of this notion.
Weak Status Quo Bias (WSQB). For any x,y ∈ X, if y ∈ c({x,y},x) or y ∈ c({x,y},♦),
then {y} = c({x,y},y).
12The idea is that if the decision maker reveals the superiority of y over x even when x is
the status quo, then, when y is itself the default option of the agent, its position can only be
stronger relative to x. This postulate, which is referred to as “conservatism” by Munro and
Sugden (2003), posits that in this case y must be the only choice from the alternative set
{x,y}, thereby preconditioning a choice correspondence to exhibit a bias towards the status
quo alternatives.16
WSQB property seems almost unexceptionable for a rational choice theory which aims
at modeling the status quo bias phenomenon. Indeed, versions of this property is recently
adopted in a few other studies (cf. Sugden (2003), Munro and Sugden (2003), Apesteguia
and Ballester (2004), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) and Sagi (2006)).17 Furthermore, the
experimental literature on individual choice provides direct veriﬁcations of WSQB.18
3.4 Referential Nature of Status Quo Alternatives
Needless to say, creating a status quo bias is not the only way the presence of a default
option may aﬀect the choice behavior of an economic agent. Such an option may act also as
a “reference” relative to which the desirability of the feasible alternatives are assessed. We
now turn to discuss how to discern this eﬀect from the choice behavior of a decision maker.
We need to introduce two auxiliary concepts for this purpose.
Deﬁnition. Let c be a choice correspondence on C(X). For any x,y ∈ X, we say that c
renders y superior to x,o rs i m p l yy is c-superior to x, if there exists a choice problem
(T,x) ∈ Csq(X) such that {y} = c(T,x). As u b s e tS of X with x ∈ S is said to be c-superior
to x, if y is c-superior to x for every y ∈ S.
16The following stronger property can be considered at this junction: For any (S,τ) ∈ C(X), if y ∈ c(S,τ),
then {y} = c(S,y). (Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) refer to this property as “Status Quo Bias.”) To the best of
our knowledge, there is no direct test of this stronger property in the literature. Moreover, there is a variety
of reasons for viewing this axiom as too demanding. (More on this shortly.)
17Sugden calls his version of SQB the “strict exchange aversion,” and Sagi the “no-regret” condition.
18A classic experiment in this regard is that of Knetsch (1989). In this experiment, subjects were parti-
tioned (at random) into two groups, with each member of one group being endowed with a coﬀee mug and
each member of the other with a chocolate bar. A few minutes later, when each subject were presented
with the opportunity of exchanging her endowment with the other one, a pronounced preference for default
options was observed.
13In words, the c-superiority of an alternative y over x means simply that if c reveals y to
be superior to x (even) when x is designated as the default option for the agent.
The following deﬁnition is key to the present investigation.
Deﬁnition. Let c be a choice correspondence on C(X). For any x,y ∈ X, we say that c
renders y essential in reference to x,o rs i m p l yy is c-essential in reference to x, if
there exists an alternative z ∈ X such that z is c-superior to x, and for some S,T ∈ ΩX
with y,z ∈ T ∩ S,
z ∈ c(S,♦) while {y} = c(T,x).
If y is not c-essential in reference to x, w es a yt h a ti ti sc-inessential in reference to x.
If y is c-essential in reference to x, then we understand that, when the agent evaluates
the feasible alternatives by using x as a reference point, the appeal of the alternative y seems
accentuated. Indeed, in this case, the agent (whose choice behavior is modeled by c) would
choose y over an alternative z, even though (i) z is c-superior to the reference point x;a n d
(ii) the agent is known to like z at least as much as y in an objective sense (i.e. in the
absence of a status quo). In this sense, the referential nature of the status quo point x leads
the agent to favor y more than she would have in the absence of a status quo.
The notions of c-superiority and c-essentialness are deﬁned through a choice correspon-
dence, and hence, they are, at least in principle, observable concepts. We now use these
notions to introduce the ﬁnal two properties for a choice correspondence. This will complete
our axiomatic model.
First, we introduce a property that identiﬁes those situations in which c disregards the
presence of a status quo alternative.
Status-quo Independence (SQI). For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) such that S is c-superior to
x, if every y ∈ S\{x} is c-inessential in reference to x, then c(S,x)=c(S,♦).
Consider a feasible set S of alternatives and a status quo point x ∈ S such that x is not
only “undesirable” in S (in the sense that all alternatives in S are deemed superior to x,
even when x acts as the default option), but it also does not distinguish between alternatives
in S by acting as a reference point (in the sense that it deems none of the alternatives in
S\{x} to be c-essential). It seems in this case that the “best” choice in S is independent
o fw h e t h e ro rn o tx is given to the agent as a default option. Because x is an undesirable
14alternative that does not play any sort of a referential role in the choice problem, it would
be entirely reasonable — from the normative as well as a descriptive angle — to expect the
agent to view the presence of x as a status quo as irrelevant for her ﬁnal choice, and thus
settle her problem by comparing the alternatives in S objectively (that is, as if there is no
status quo in the problem). This is the gist of SQI.19
Dominance (D). For any S ∈ ΩX and (T,x) ∈ Csq(X),
y ∈ c(S,♦) and {y} = c(T,x) implies y ∈ c(S,x),
provided that T\{x} contains at least one alternative that is c-essential in reference to x.
To see the crux of this postulate, consider a feasible set S of alternatives, and suppose
that y is revealed to be a “best” alternative in S, absent any status quo considerations. Now
consider the alternative scenario in which the agent faces the choice problem S with some
x ∈ S being her default option. Under which circumstances would it be reasonable to expect
y to be deemed “choosable” by the agent in this situation as well?
There are at least two reasons for y not to be chosen from the problem (S,x) even though
it is chosen from the problem (S,♦). First of all, due to “status quo bias” x may look more
desirable to the agent in the problem (S,x), and hence she may opt for x in that problem
instead of y. But what if {y} = c(T,x) for some choice problem (T,x)? Then, apparently,
this is not the case –after all, this observation tells us that y is, in fact, c-superior to x–
the agent thinks y is a better choice than x even when x is her dafault option. Still, this
may not be enough to view y “choosable” in the problem (S,x). For, perhaps, utilizing x
as a reference point takes away from the relative desirability of y in the mind of the agent,
leading to the choice of some other (presumably c-essential) alternative in the problem (S,x).
N o wi fw ea l s ok n e wt h a tt h i si sn o tt h ec a s e ,t h a ti s ,i fy is deemed “choosable” even in
the presence of a c-essential alternative in reference to x (when, of course, x is the status
q u o )—a si tw o u l db et h ec a s ei fT\{x} contained some c-essential alternatives in reference
to x — then this objection dissipates as well. In this case, speaking both descriptively and
19To wit, consider the following alternatives: z := “watching a new episode of ‘24’ tonight,” y := “watching
a new episode of ‘Lost’ tonight,” and x := “getting killed tonight by painful torture.” It is hardly disputable
that, in this case, it is indeed irrelevant that x is given as a default option to the agent — we are bound to
declare y and z c-inessential in reference to x, and have c({x,y,z},x)=c({x,y,z},♦), as posited by SQI.
15normatively, it seems quite reasonable to expect y to be a “choice” in the problem (S,x) —
this is precisely what the property D envisages.
4 Procedural Choice with Status Quo Bias
4.1 The Main Result
We need to introduce a ﬁnal bit of terminology before we state the main result of this paper.
Deﬁnition. Let A b ea n ys e t .B yaself-correspondence on A, we mean a map Γ from A
into 2A\{∅}. We say that Γ is injective if a 6= b implies Γ(a) 6= Γ(b).
Notation. The lower contour set of an alternative x ∈ X with respect to the (utility)
function U : X → R is denoted as LU(x), that is,
LU(x): ={y ∈ X : U(x) ≥ U(y)}.
The following theorem provides a complete characterization of those rational choice corre-
spondences that satisfy the three “descriptive/normative” properties considered above. We
ﬁnd that any such choice correspondence can, in fact, be rationalized by means of a simple
choice “procedure.”
Theorem A. Let c : C(X) → 2X be any map. Then, c is a rational choice correspondence
on C(X) that satisﬁes WSQB, SQI and D if, and only if, there exist a continuous map
U : X → R and two closed-valued injective self-correspondences Q1 and Q2 on X such that,
for every x ∈ X,
LU(x) ∩ Q
1(x)={x} = LU(x) ∩ Q
2(x) and Q
1(x) ⊆ Q
2(x), (2)
while, for every S ∈ ΩX,
c(S,♦)= a r gm a x
ω∈S
U(ω), (3)
and, for every (S,x) ∈ Csq(X),
c(S,x)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
argmax
ω∈S∩Q1(x)
U(ω), if S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x}
argmax
ω∈S∩Q2(x)
U(ω), otherwise.
(4)
16To understand the nature of the choice model obtained through Theorem A, consider a
decision maker whose choice correspondence c is rational and satisﬁes WSQB, SQI and D.
When dealing with a choice problem without a status quo, this agent makes her choices upon
maximizing a utility function U – this is, of course, in complete accordance with the weak
axiom of revealed preference.
In turn, this agent deals with any given choice problem with a status quo point, say
with (S,x), by means of a simple two-stage procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, she uses a mental
“constraint set” Q1(x) and eliminates all feasible alternatives that does not belong to this
constraint set. If, other than the default option x, exactly one feasible alternative passes this
test, then that alternative is the unique choice of the agent in the problem. If more than
one alternative in S\{x} pass this test, then the agent chooses among these alternatives the
ones that yield the highest satisfaction in terms of her (objective) utility function U. If, on
the other hand, every alternative in S, other than x, fails this test, that is, S ∩Q1(x)={x},
then the agent moves to the second stage of her procedure.
At this stage, the agent reasons exactly as she did in the ﬁrst stage, except now, perhaps
realizing that she made an “overuse” of her default option x as a reference point, she relaxes
her mental constraint set to a bigger set Q2(x). The decision maker settles her problem, then,
upon searching for alternatives in S ∩ Q2(x). If this search yields exactly one alternative in
S\{x}, then that’s her choice. If more than one alternative pass this test, then the ones with
the highest U value constitute the set of all choices of the agent. If no feasible alternative
other than x passes this second test either, that is, S ∩Q2(x)={x}, then the agent chooses
not to move from her status quo point x.20
A few remarks on the interpretation of this choice model are in order. There are indeed
multiple ways of thinking about the set Q1(x). Descriptively speaking, one may think of this
set as arising from a psychological phenomenon. Simply put, the presence of the status quo
point x, acting as a reference, leads the agent to concentrate only on those alternatives that
are better than x in some unambiguous sense for her. Normatively speaking, on the other
20There is a natural generalization of this choice procedure. Indeed, one can think of the agent as relaxing
her mental constraint set further at this point to some Q3(x) (with LU(x)∩Q3(x)={x}) and then evaluating
the alternatives in S ∩ Q3(x), instead of simply opting for the default option x. If this does not work, that
is S ∩ Q3(x)={x}, she might consider relaxing her constraint set further, and so on. This sort of a choice
model is, of course, not without interest. Nonetheless, its axiomatic basis, and hence the determination of a
complete (behavioral) test for it, seems like a notoriously diﬃcult task.
17hand, one may think of the elimination of those alternatives in S\Q1(x) (distinct from x)
from consideration as a “simpliﬁcation” the agent uses to settle her possibly complex choice
problem. Either of these interpretations sits well with the “boundedly rational” choice model
envisaged by Theorem A.
The interpretation of the set Q2(x) follows a similar line of reasoning. From a descriptive
angle, one can think of the agent as allowing for more trade-oﬀs in her evaluation, and hence
relaxing somewhat her reference-dependence, upon observing that using Q1(x) to eliminate
alternatives from selection contention leaves no room for choice (other than the default
option). This is perhaps because she realizes that an alternative y, while not unambiguously
better than x for her, may still have a much higher utility value than x, and hence it may be
a “mistake” to eliminate y from consideration. Similarly, from a normative angle, the fact
that S ∩Q1(x)={x} m a ym a k et h ea g e n tr e a l i z et h a tu s i n gQ1(x) to eliminate alternatives
may have “oversimpliﬁed” the problem. This realization leads her to adopt a less restrictive
rule of elimination, focusing this time on the alternatives S ∩ Q2(x).
4.2 Rationality, Status Quo Bias and Reference Dependence
The model given by Theorem A carries elements of rationality as well as the phenomena of
status quo bias and reference dependence. First, observe that an agent whose choice behavior
abides by this model is indistinguishable from a standard utility maximizer in the context
of choice problems without a status quo. Moreover, even in a choice problem with a given
initial entitlement x, among the alternatives that pass the tests imposed by the presence of
x, the ﬁnal choice is determined upon maximizing the reference-independent utility function.
Thus, while the standard choice model is a “utility maximization model,” the choice model we
derived here is a “constrained utility maximization model,” where the constraint is induced
by one’s default option.
Second, the present model exhibits the phenomenon of status quo bias – it is, after all,
built on the property SQB. We see this from the representation obtained in Theorem A due
to the fact that LU(x) ∩ Qi(x)={x},i=1 ,2. This condition ensures that if y is chosen
from the problem (S,x), then we must have U(y) >U (x) – this is only to be expected –
but even if all alternatives in S\{x} has a strictly higher utility than x, one may still have
{x} = c(S,x). In particular, if U(y) >U(x), but y/ ∈ Q2(x), then {x} = c({x,y},x).
Having said this, we should note that the status quo bias allowed in the model is somewhat
18limited. In particular, if y ∈ c(S,x), then we do not have to have y ∈ c(S,y) as well. (Notice
that SQB requires this only for the case S = {x,y}.) The following example illustrates.
Example 2. Let X := {x,y,z}, and consider a choice correspondence c of the form given
by Theorem A, where z ∈ Q2(x)\Q1(x),y∈ Q1(x), and z ∈ Q2(y). (See Figure 3.) In this
case, we have {y} = c({x,y,z},x) whereas {z} = c({x,y,z},y).
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
It follows that the present model allows for a curious menu-dependence.C o n s i d e r , f o r
instance, an individual who views the insurance policies z and y better than her current
policy x. Suppose, because y is clearly superior to x in all relevant dimensions – while z
is not so, even though it yields better utility than x in the aggregate – this agent chooses
to buy policy y. It is quite conceivable that, when asked again, this agent then opts for z.
After all, she has in fact chosen y due to x being the reference point, and now, y is instead
the reference point, and this may well overturn her earlier decision.21
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a tt h ec h o i c em o d e lo fT h e o r e mAu s e sas t a t u sq u op o i n tn o to n l ya s
an alternative whose “value” is somewhat accentuated for the agent, but also, it allows for
it to be used as a reference. The next example illustrates.
Example 1. [Continued] We revisit the issue pointed out in Example 1. Let X :=
{x,x0,y,z}, and consider a choice correspondence c of the form given by Theorem A, where
c({y,z},♦)={y} = c({x,y,z},x). Can this agent choose z instead of y in the problem
({x0,y,z},x 0), where x0 is an unambiguously worse alternative than x. In a model where
one’s initial endowment lacks referential status, the answer would be no, as worsening of a
status quo alternative would then not alter the decisions of the agent. On the other hand, as
shown in Figure 4, the present model duly allows for {z} = c({x0,y,z},x 0), signifying how
it incorporates the notion of “reference-dependent” decision making.22
21Needless to say, no “cycles” may occur through this reasoning, however. z remains to be the unique
choice in this example (because z ∈ Q2(x) ∩ Q2(y) implies U(z) > max{U(x),U(y)}).
22Incidentally, the considerations outlined above show in exactly what way the present work improves
upon the earlier related work of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). While this is not entirely obvious, one can show
that the model obtained in the latter paper is a special case of that of Theorem A in which Q1 = Q2. It is
for this reason that the latter model gives no “reference status” to the initial entitlement of an agent, and
thus, it has a substantially less explanatory power than the present model (Section 2.2).
19FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
5 Multicriteria Decision Making with Status Quo Bias
T h ec h o i c em o d e ld e r i v e di nT h e o r e mAi sab i tt o og e n e r a li nt h a ti td o e sn o tp u ta n y
restrictions about how the mental constraints captured by the correspondences Q1 and Q2
change across alternatives. For instance, consider a choice correspondence c that is repre-
s e n t e da si nT h e o r e mA ,a n ds u p p o s ey ∈ Q2(x) and z ∈ Q2(y). Thus, a decision maker
with this choice correspondence deems y better than x even when x is her default option,
and z better than y even when y is her default choice. So, informally speaking, there is a
sense in which y is “much better than” x and z is “much better than” y for this agent. It is
thus only reasonable to expect z to be deemed “much better than” x, that is, to posit that
z ∈ Q2(x). The model at hand, however, does not guarantee this to be the case.
As similar remarks apply also to the correspondence Q1, it is natural to inquire in what
way we can ensure that Q1 and Q2 in Theorem A behave transitively. The following property
expresses this behavioral requirement in terms of the primitive choice correspondence c.
Transitivity of the Reference Eﬀect (TRE). Given any (S,x),(T,y) ∈ Csq(X),l e t
{y} = c(S,x) and {z} = c(T,y). Then z ∈ c({x,z},x). Moreover, if S\{x} contains a
c-essential alternative in reference to x, and T\{y} contains a c-essential alternative in
reference to y, then z ∈ c(S ∪ {z},x).
Adding this “‘transitive evaluation” requirement to our basic axiomatic system warrants
the properties Q1 ◦ Q1 ⊆ Q1 and Q2 ◦ Q2 ⊆ Q2. In turn, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly,
this allows one to view the resulting model as one of multicriteria decision making, at least
when the grand alternative space X is ﬁnite.
T of o r m a l i z et h i sl a t t e rp o i n t ,w en e e dt oi n t r o d u c et h ef o l l o w i n gn o t a t i o n .
Notation. For any positive integer d and vector-valued function w : X → Rd, the strict
upper contour set of an alternative x ∈ X with respect to w is denoted as Uw(x), that is,
Uw(x): ={y ∈ X : w(y) > w(x)}.
20The next result describes how Theorem A modiﬁes in the presence of the transitive
evaluation postulate TRE, when X is ﬁnite.
Theorem B. Let X be a nonempty ﬁnite set, and take any c : C(X) → 2X. Then, c is a
choice correspondence on C(X) that satisﬁe sW S Q B ,D ,S Q I ,a n dT R Ei f ,a n do n l yi f ,t h e r e
exist positive integers m and n,t w oi n j e c t i o n su : X → Rm and v : X → Rn, and a map
f : Rm+n → R such that
c(S,♦)= a r gm a x
ω∈S
U(ω) for all S ∈ ΩX,
where U : X → R is deﬁned by U(ω): =f(u(ω),v(ω)), and, for every (S,x) ∈ Csq(X),
c(S,x)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
argmax
ω∈S∩U(u,v)(x)
U(ω), if S ∩ U(u,v)(x) 6= ∅
argmax
ω∈S∩Uu(x)
U(ω), if S ∩ U(u,v)(x)=∅ and S ∩ Uu(x) 6= ∅
{x}, otherwise.
One can thus view the present choice model as one of “constrained multiobjective maxi-
mization,” at least when X is a ﬁnite set.23 Let us demonstrate the “as if” interpretation of
this model by means of a concrete example. Consider a professor at an economics depart-
ment — let us call her Prof. σ — who needs to evaluate the ﬁles of applicants for the research
assistantship position that she is able to oﬀer for the coming year. Prof. σ has identiﬁed, say,
ﬁve criteria as relevant for her evaluation (e.g. the GPA, overall computer skills, strength
of recommendation letters, interest in the project, and previous research experience). She
aggregates these criteria in some manner, and identiﬁes those candidates whose aggregate
score is the largest. (Thus, in the absence of a status quo choice, Prof. σ solves her problem
as a utility maximizer, in full conformity with the model exhibited in Theorem B.)
For purposes of this illustration, suppose that the maximization exercise of Prof. σ results
in a single choice, say, the candidate γ. Yet, just when she gets ready to call this candidate,
a new pile of ﬁles ﬁnds its way to her desk. As a consequence, she gets on solving her new
choice problem, but this time in the presence of a default option, namely, the candidate γ.
23For the reason why one needs the ﬁniteness assumption here, see Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Remark 2.
21If her choice behavior abides with that of Theorem B, then, Prof. σ would get on comparing
every new ﬁle with that of the candidate γ with respect to all ﬁve of her choice criteria.
Suppose she ﬁnds none of the new ﬁles superior to that of γ in all dimensions. Then, she
moves to the second stage of her decision rule, perhaps realizing that her status quo bias
may have resulted in the elimination of certain candidates who perform great in all but one
criterion (with respect to which γ’s ﬁle looks better). At this stage, she uses only a subset
of her original criteria (e.g. disregards the strength of recommendation letters, and interest
in the project), and examines again if any of the new ﬁles dominates that of γ with respect
to the remaining three rationales. If the answer is yes, then she will identify all the ﬁles
that dominate the applicant γ with respect to the three criteria and choose the one(s) that
perform best in terms of all ﬁve of her objectives according to her aggregation rule.
This example illustrates in what way we can think of the choice model of Theorem B as
a procedural model of multicriteria decision making. It also shows that the basic makeup
of this model is hardly superﬁcial, it surely has elements of the actual decision procedures
familiar from daily discourse. It is a boundedly rational choice model, to be sure. Yet, it
is one that embodies a good deal of rationality. Indeed, it satisﬁes all of the rationality
axioms considered in Section 3.2 as well as the transitive evaluation requirement TRE, and
moreover, it never leads to a cyclical choice pattern.
In passing, we note that Theorem B makes it clear the exact manner in which the present
work improves upon the model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) discussed in Section 2.2. In
particular, if the behavior of Prof. σ above was modeled according to that model (with the
same set of criteria), then her evaluation process would have stopped at the stage where she
did not ﬁnd any of the new ﬁles superior to her default choice. The said model maintains
that her ﬁnal choice be surely the applicant γ, thereby exhibiting a perhaps unacceptably
high amount of a status quo bias.
6O v e r v a l u a t i o n
6.1 Overvaluation of Reference Alternatives
The presence of an “objective” utility function U in the choice model under consideration
allows one to pose a number of economic questions in a formally meaningful manner. Indeed,
22this function tells us the reference-independent evaluation of alternatives, and hence acts as a
natural yardstick for assessing the value of an alternative, say, when this alternative serves as
a reference for the decision maker. In particular, we may deﬁne the smallest valuation for
an alternative x as a reference —d e n o t e db yUc(x) — as the smallest “reference-independent
value” for which the agent needs to be oﬀered to be willing to depart from x, when x is
designated as her endowment.T h a ti s :
U
c(x): =i n f {U(y):x 6= y ∈ c({x,y},x)},x ∈ X.
When Uc(x) >U(x), we say that x is “overvalued” when it is an endowment.
The following result clariﬁes the position of the choice model characterized in Theorem
A with respect to the relation between the maps U and Uc. It turns out that this model
is consistent with both the absence and presence of overvaluation of one’s endowment, and
there is an easy way of detecting which is the case.
Proposition C. Let c be a choice correspondence on C(X) for which there exists a con-
tinuous (utility) function U on X, and two closed-valued injective self-correspondences Q1
and Q2 that satisfy (2), (3) and (4). Then, for any x ∈ X with Uc(x) < ∞, we have
Uc(x)=U(x) if, and only if, x is an accumulation point of Q2(x).24
We can also use the reference-independent utility function U to deﬁne the largest val-
uation of x as a non-reference — denoted Uc(x) — as the largest “value” of endowment y
at which the agent would be willing to exchange y with the alternative x. That is,
Uc(x): =s u p {U(y):y 6= x ∈ c({x,y},y)},x ∈ X.
Studying the relation between Uc(x) and U(x) turns out to be a delicate matter. While, as
in Proposition C, it is possible to give a (topological) characterization of when the equation
Uc(x)=U(x) would be true, this sort of a result is not likely to be useful in applications.
Fortunately, there is an easy suﬃciency condition for Uc(x)=U(x) to hold, at least in the
case where X is also endowed with a linear structure (as in a Euclidean space). We report
this result next.
24For any nonempty set A in a metric space X, we say that a point x ∈ A is an accumulation point of A
if there is a sequence in A\{x} that converges to x.
23Proposition D. Let X be a compact and convex subset of a normed linear space. Let c be
a choice correspondence on C(X) for which there exists a continuous (utility) function U on
X, and two closed-valued injective self-correspondences Q1 and Q2 that satisfy (2), (3) and
(4). Then, for any x ∈ X with Uc(x) > −∞, we have Uc(x)=U(x),p r o v i d e dt h a tQ2 is a
convex correspondence.25
Our main interest in Propositions C and D derive from the implications of these results
about the potential gap between WTP and WTA. We shall invoke them below to clarify the
standing of our choice model with regard to this matter.
6.2 Willingness to Pay (WTP) vs. Willingness to Accept (WTA)
As we have discussed in Sections 1 and 2, a major channel through which the endowment
eﬀect was discovered in experimental environments is the discrepancy found between buying
and selling prices of commodities by the individuals.26 As we discussed earlier, however, the
new evidence indicates that the gap between WTP and WTA need not at all exist, especially
i nt h ec a s eo fexperienced traders. Of course, this does not mean that an experienced trader
would necessarily behave in a reference-independent manner. It just means that the nature
of the reference-dependence of such an agent is devoid of the endowment eﬀect. It follows
that the descriptive power of a reference-dependent choice model would be higher, if this
model is able cope with the absence of the endowment eﬀect, and yet allows for other types
of reference dependence (such as status quo bias, etc.).
Our immediate goal is to formalize the comparison of WTP and WTA in terms of choice
correspondences. (It is to our surprise that no such formalization is carried out in the litera-
ture, despite the substantial amount work on this matter.) By way of a consistency check, we
will then prove that the Tversky-Kahneman model necessarily entails a gap between WTP
and WTA. Finally, we will show that the present choice model may or may not allow for
such a gap.
Consider an environment with two commodities, say, mugs and money. To conform with
the previous experimental literature, we outline the arguments in terms of a single unit of a
25This condition simply means that the graph of Q2 is a convex subset of X × X.
26See Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) and Camerer (1995, pp. 665-670) for detailed surveys on
this matter.
24mug. Consequently, we designate
X := I × [0,1]
as the grand alternative space of this environment, where I is an interval of the form [0,α]
with α>0 b e i n gas u ﬃciently large positive number. (Here a pair like (a,1) ∈ X is
interpreted as the agent possessing a dollars and “the” mug, while (b,0) ∈ X corresponds to
the bundle that contains b dollars and no mug.)
Now consider a decision maker whose initial monetary endowment is wo ∈ I dollars.27
We deﬁne the willingness to accept of this agent (for “the” mug) as
wta(c): =i n f {a ≥ 0:( wo + a,0) ∈ c({(wo + a,0),(wo,1)},(wo,1))},
where c corresponds her choice correspondence on C(X). That is, wta(c) is the smallest
amount of money that this agent, if endowed with “the” mug, would charge to sell the mug.
The formulation of WTP is less straightforward. We follow in our demonstration the basic
contention of Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and postulate that the act of giving up money
to buy goods is viewed by the agent not as a loss, but as a foregone gain of money. This
leads one to deﬁne the willingness to pay of this agent (for “the” mug) as
wtp(c): =s u p {wo ≥ a ≥ 0:( wo,1) ∈ c({(wo,1),(wo + a,0)},(wo + a,0))}.
That is, wtp(c) is the largest amount of money increment the agent would be willing to give
up to be able obtain “the” mug. To simplify the discussion, we assume that wo > wtp(c),
that is, the agent is not willing to give up all of her monetary wealth just to be able to
receive “the” mug.
Let us ﬁrst consider how wta(c) and wtp(c) would compare if we modeled c according to
the Tversky-Kahneman (loss aversion) model reviewed in Section 2.1. We adopt the notation
introduced in that section, but here we label u1 and u2 as u and v, respectively. Clearly, the
Tversky-Kahneman model maintains that
wta(c)=i n f {a ≥ 0:u(wo + a − wo)+v(0 − 1) ≥ 0}
(since u(0) = 0 = v(0)), and therefore, since u is continuous and strictly increasing, it follows
that u(wta(c)) = −v(−1). Similarly,
wtp(c)=s u p {wo ≥ a ≥ 0:u(wo − (wo + a)) + v(1 − 0) ≥ 0},
27Within the formalism of the present illustration, α can be any real number greater than or equal to 2wo.
25and it follows that u(−wtp(c)) = −v(1). Consequently,
u(wta(c)) = −v(−1) >v (1) = −u(−wtp(c)) >u (wtp(c)),
where the strict inequalities follow from the hypothesis of loss aversion. Since u is strictly
increasing, we conclude that
wta(c) > wtp(c)
must hold if c is induced by the Tversky-Kahneman model. It follows that the recent
empirical evidence that shows that, at least for experienced traders, there is no signiﬁcant
gap between WTP and WTA, refutes this model.
Let us now consider the case where c is instead modeled as in Theorem A, where U :
X → R is assumed to be strictly increasing in both components. In that case, we readily
ﬁnd that
U
c(wo,1) = inf{U(wo + a,0) : a ≥ 0 and (wo + a,0) ∈ c({(wo + a,0),(wo,1)},(wo,1))}
= U(wo + wta(c),0)
by deﬁnition of Uc and wta(c). But Proposition C ensures us that U(wo,1) = Uc(wo,1), and
hence U(wo,1) = U(wo+wta(c),0), holds iﬀ (wo,1) is an accumulation point of the mental
constraint set Q2(wo,1). Similarly, using Proposition D, we ﬁnd U(wo,1) = Uc(wo,1) =
U(wo+ wtp(c),0), provided that Q2 is a convex correspondence. It follows that, not only is
that c is consistent with the absence of a gap between WTP and WTA, but we have an easy
way of telling when this gap does not exist:
Fact. If X := I × [0,1] and c is as derived in Theorem A (with strictly increasing U and
convex Q2),t h e n
wta(c)=wtp(c)
if and only if (wo,1) is an accumulation point of Q2(wo,1).
Therefore, depending on the speciﬁcations of its basic ingredients, the present model is
suitable for modeling the behavior of both experienced and inexperienced traders. It is a
boundedly rational choice model that allows for status quo bias and reference-dependent
choice, yet it does not necessitate the presence of the endowment eﬀect.28
28It may be worth noting that the latter property does not depend on not modeling payments as “losses.”
267C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we adopted the revealed preference method to derive a boundedly rational
individual decision making model that allows for an agent not only to exhibit status quo
bias, but also to make use of her default option as a reference point. The resulting model
contains elements of the classical rational choice model, but can also be viewed as arising from
a three-step choice procedure that involves multiple objectives. Moreover, while it permits
status quo bias, it does not necessarily lead to the overvaluation of one’s endowment, and
hence it is duly consistent with the absence of a gap between one’s willingness to sell and
buy a given choice alternative.
Insofar as we can (objectively) assess, the model proposed here seems promising from
an initial theoretical standpoint. Yet, obviously, its usefulness needs to be determined by
means of its direct experimental testing and its predictive and explanatory performance in
economic applications.
8P r o o f s
8.1 Proof of Theorem A
Let c be a rational choice correspondence on C(X) that satisﬁe sW S Q B ,Da n dS Q I .D e ﬁne
the binary relation < on X by
y < x if and only if y ∈ c({x,y},♦).
The same conclusion holds if instead one chooses to model the act of giving up money in exchange of goods
as a loss as well (cf. Bateman, et al (1997, 2005)). To say this precisely, let so and bo stand for the initial
wealth of the seller and buyer, respectively, and to achieve comparability of initial standings, suppose that
U(so,1) = U(bo,0). We deﬁne the minimum selling price of the mug as
S(c): =i n f{a ≥ 0:( so + a,0) ∈ c({(so + a,0),(so,1)},(so,1))},
and the maximum buying price as
B(c): =s u p {bo ≥ a ≥ 0:( bo − a,1) ∈ c({(bo − a,1),(bo,0)},(bo,0))}.
Under the conditions of Fact above, then, S(c)=S(c) iﬀ (so,1) is an accumulation point of Q2(so,1).
27Standard arguments, based on the α-a n dβ-Axioms and part (a) of UHC, verify that < is a
continuous and complete preorder on X. By the Debreu Representation Theorem, therefore,
there exists a continuous map U : X → R such that y < x iﬀ U(y) ≥ U(x), for any x,y ∈ X.
Applying the α-a n dβ-Axioms, then, we ﬁnd
c(S,♦)=a r gm a x {U(x):x ∈ S} for any S ∈ ΩX. (5)
Next we deﬁne the self-correspondence Q2 on X by
Q
2(x): ={y ∈ X : y ∈ c({x,y},x)},
and note that, by WSQB, y ∈ Q2(x) implies {y} = c({x,y},x) so that, in view of the
α-Axiom,
Q
2(x)={y ∈ X : y is c-superior to x}.
Evidently, x ∈ Q2(x) for each x ∈ X, and hence Q2 is well-deﬁned.
Claim 1. Q2 is injective and closed-valued. Moreover, for any x ∈ X, if y ∈ Q2(x) and
U(y) ≤ U(x), then y = x.
Proof of Claim 1. To prove the injectivity assertion, note that if x ∈ Q2(y), then {x} =
c({x,y},x) by WSQB, while y ∈ Q2(x) means y ∈ c({x,y},x), which is possible in this case
only if x = y. It follows that Q2(x)=Q2(y) implies x = y.
Now pick any x ∈ X, and take any sequence (ym) in Q2(x) with ym → y for some y ∈ X.
If ym = x for inﬁnitely many m, then y = x ∈ Q2(x). If ym = x for only ﬁnitely many m,
then it is without loss of generality to assume that ym 6= x for each m. In that case, applying
part (b) of UHC readily yields y ∈ c({x,y},x), that is, y ∈ Q2(x).S i n c ex was arbitrarily
chosen in X, this proves that Q2 is closed-valued.
Finally, pick any x,y ∈ X such that U(y) ≤ U(x). By (5), we have x ∈ c({x,y},♦), so
WSQB implies {x} = c({x,y},x). But, unless y = x, this means that y/ ∈ Q2(x). The proof
of Claim 1 is now complete. ¤
Claim 2. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X),
c(S,x) ⊆ c(S ∩ Q
2(x),x).
P r o o fo fC l a i m2 . Take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X), and let y ∈ c(S,x). By the α-Axiom,
y ∈ c({x,y},x), that is, y ∈ S ∩ Q2(x). Applying the α-Axiom again, therefore, we ﬁnd
y ∈ c(S ∩ Q2(x),x). ¤
28The converse containment in Claim 2 can be established only under a certain condition.
To specify this condition we need to introduce two further notions. First we deﬁne the
self-correspondence E on X by
E(x): ={y ∈ Q
2(x):y is c-essential in reference to x},
and second, the self-correspondence Q1 on X by
Q
1(x): =E(x) ∪ {ω ∈ Q
2(x):{ω} = c({x,w,ω},x) for some w ∈ E(x)\{x}}.
Since any x is c-essential in reference to itself, we have x ∈ E(x) for each x ∈ X —b o t hE
and Q1 are thus well-deﬁned. Moreover, it is obvious that Q1(x) ⊆ Q2(x) for all x ∈ X.
Using this fact, one can show that Q1 is injective and LU(x) ∩ Q1(x)={x} in exactly the
same way we proved the corresponding versions of these assertions in Claim 2.
Claim 3. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ∩ Q1(x)={x},
c(S ∩ Q
2(x),x)=c(S ∩ Q
2(x),♦).
P r o o fo fC l a i m3 .Take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ∩ Q1(x)={x}. Let T := S ∩ Q2(x),
and pick any y ∈ T\{x}. Then, by Claim 1, U(y) >U(x) so (5) implies {y} = c({x,y},♦).
In turn, since y is c-inessential in reference to x, SQI implies c({x,y},♦)=c({x,y},x), so
we ﬁnd {y} = c({x,y},x). It follows that T is c-superior to x. Moreover, S ∩ Q1(x)={x}
means that S ∩ E(x)={x}, that is, each alternative in S\{x} is c-inessential relative to x.
T h e n ,b yS Q I ,w eh a v ec(T,x)=c(T,♦). ¤
Claim 4. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ∩ Q1(x)={x},
c(S,x)=c(S ∩ Q
2(x),♦).
P r o o fo fC l a i m4 .Take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S∩Q1(x)={x}. Let y ∈ c(S∩Q2(x),♦).
Then y ∈ c(S ∩ Q2(x),x) by Claim 3. Take any z ∈ c(S,x). Then z ∈ S ∩ Q2(x),s o
z ∈ c(S∩Q2(x),x) by Claim 2. Thus, by the β-Axiom, y ∈ c(S,x). It follows that c(S,x) ⊇
c(S ∩ Q2(x),♦). Combining this with Claims 2 and 3 completes the argument. ¤
Combining Claim 4 with (5), we conclude: For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X),
c(S,x)= a r gm a x
y∈S∩Q2(x)
U(y),
29provided that S ∩ Q1(x)={x}.
We now turn to the analysis of the choice problems (S,x) with S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x}.
Claim 5. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x},
c(S,x) ⊆ S ∩ Q
1(x).
P r o o fo fC l a i m5 .Take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x}, and let y ∈ c(S,x).
Evidently, by the α-Axiom, so y ∈ Q2(x). Now assume ﬁrst that S ∩ E(x) 6= {x}. Let z be
an element of S∩E(x) distinct from x. By the α-Axiom, we have y ∈ c({x,y,z},x). If {y} =
c({x,y,z},x), then we trivially have y ∈ Q1(x). If, on the other hand, {y} 6= c({x,y,z},x),
then WSQB implies {y,z} = c({x,y,z},x). So, in this case, by the β-a n dβ
∗-Axioms, we
have z ∈ c(S,x) and {y,z} = c({y,z},♦), that is, by (5),
y,z ∈ c(S,x) and U(y)=U(z). (6)
But since z ∈ E(x), there exists a w ∈ Q2(x) such that
U(w) >U(z) and {z} = c({x,w,z},x). (7)
The second part of (7) and the α-Axiom yield w/ ∈ c(S ∪ {w},x). Then, given that y ∈
c(S,x), applying the α-a n dβ-Axioms again, we ﬁnd y ∈ c(S ∪ {w},x). It follows that
y ∈ c({x,w,y},x) by α-a n dβ-Axioms. Moreover, w/ ∈ c({x,w,y},x),f o ro t h e r w i s et h e
α-a n dβ-Axioms would entail w ∈ c(S ∪ {w},x) w h i c hw ek n o wt ob ef a l s e . I ns u m ,
{y} = c({x,w,y},x), while by (6) and (7), we have U(w) >U(y). Thus y ∈ E(x) ⊆ Q1(x),
as desired.
We now turn to the case where S ∩ E(x)={x}. In this case, because S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x},
there exists a z in S∩(Q1(x)\E(x)). (Since x ∈ E(x),zis distinct from x.)B yd e ﬁnition of Q1,
then, there must exist a w ∈ E(x)\{x} such that {z} = c({x,w,z},x). Now, by the α-Axiom,
w c a n n o tb ea ne l e m e n to fc({x,y,w,z},x). So, since y ∈ c({x,y,z},x) by the α-Axiom, we
are assured by the β-Axiom that y ∈ c({x,y,w,z},x). It follows that y ∈ c({x,y,w},x) by
the α-Axiom. Moreover, since w/ ∈ c({x,y,w,z},x), the β-Axiom implies w/ ∈ c({x,y,w},x),
so {y} = c({x,y,w},x). Since w ∈ E(x), this means that y ∈ Q1(x), as is sought. ¤
Claim 6. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x},
c(S,x)=c
¡
cl(S ∩ Q
1(x)),x
¢
.
30P r o o fo fC l a i m6 .Take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x}. If y ∈ c(S,x), then,
by Claim 5, y ∈ S ∩ Q1(x), so, obviously, y ∈ cl(S ∩ Q1(x)). By the α-Axiom, therefore,
y ∈ c(cl(S ∩ Q1(x)),x). Conversely, let y ∈ c(cl(S ∩ Q1(x)),x). Pick any z ∈ c(S,x), and
observe that z ∈ c(cl(S ∩ Q1(x)),x) by the ⊆ part of the present assertion. So, applying
the β-Axiom, we ﬁnd y ∈ c(S,x), and the claim is proved. ¤
Claim 7. If y ∈ Q1(x)\{x}, then {y} = c(T,x) for some (T,x) ∈ Csq(X) such that
T ∩ E(x) 6= {x}.
P r o o fo fC l a i m7 . Take any y ∈ Q1(x) with y 6= x. Since y ∈ Q2(x), we have {y} =
c({x,y},x) by WSQB. Thus, if y ∈ E(x), we are done upon setting T := {x,y}. If, on the
other hand, y ∈ Q1(x)\E(x), then, by deﬁnition of Q1, there exists a w ∈ E(x)\{x} such
that {y} = c({x,w,z},x). In this case setting T := {x,y,w} completes the proof. ¤
Claim 8. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ⊆ Q1(x),
c(S,x)=c(S,♦).
P r o o fo fC l a i m8 .Take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with S ⊆ Q1(x). Note that the claim is trivial
if S = {x}, so assume S 6= {x}.
Let z ∈ c(S,x). Note that if z = x, then WSQB and the α-Axiom imply that S∩Q2(x)=
{x}. Then, since S ⊆ Q1(x) ⊆ Q2(x), we ﬁnd S = {x}, a contradiction. So we have z 6= x,
and hence by WSQB, U(z) >U (x). To derive a contradiction, assume U(y) >U (z) for
some y ∈ S\{x}. Then {y} = c({x,y,z},♦) by (5). Moreover, since S ⊆ Q1(x), we have
y ∈ Q1(x)\{x}, so by Claim 7, y = c(T,x) for some (T,x) ∈ Csq(X) such that T\{x}
contains an alternative that is c-essential in reference to x. By D, therefore, we have y ∈
c({x,y,z},x). By the α-Axiom, then, {y,z} = c({x,y,z},x). But then, by the β
∗-Axiom,
{y,z} = c({y,z},♦), that is, U(y)=U(z), a contradiction. We conclude that U(z) ≥ U(y)
for all y ∈ S. In view of (5), this means that z ∈ c(S,♦). That is, c(S,x) ⊆ c(S,♦).
To establish the converse containment, take any y ∈ c(S,♦). If y = x, then the α-Axiom
and WSQB imply that {x} = c({x,z},x) for all z ∈ S. Since S ⊆ Q1(x) ⊆ Q2(x), this
is possible only if S = {x}, a contradiction. So we have y ∈ Q1(x)\{x}. Then, by Claim
7, y = c(T,x) for some (T,x) ∈ Csq(X) such that T\{x} contains an alternative that is
c-essential in reference to x. By D, therefore, we have y ∈ c(S,x). That is, c(S,♦) ⊆ c(S,x).
¤
31The present development establishes the main assertion in the case of ﬁnite choice prob-
lems.
Claim 9. For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) with |S| < ∞ and S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x},
c(S,x)=a r gm a x {U(y):y ∈ S ∩ Q
1(x)}.
Proof of Claim 9. Since S is a ﬁnite set, Claim 6 says that c(S,x)=c(S ∩ Q1(x),x).
But S ∩ Q1(x) ⊆ Q1(x), so c(S ∩ Q1(x),x)=c(S ∩ Q1(x),♦) by Claim 8. Applying (5)
completes the proof. ¤
The ﬁnal step of the argument is given next.
Claim 10. Q1(x) is a closed set for any x ∈ X.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 0 . Let (ym) be a sequence in Q1(x) which converges to some y ∈ X.
Since Q1(x) ⊆ Q2(x) and Q2(x) is closed, y ∈ Q2(x). We wish to show that y ∈ Q1(x). The
argument proceeds by distinguishing between two cases.
Case 1. ym ∈ E(x) for inﬁnitely many m.
Passing to a subsequence, if necessary, we may assume in this case that ym ∈ E(x) for
each m =1 ,2,.... Then, for each m, there exists a zm ∈ Q2(x) such that
U(zm) >U(ym) and {ym} = c({x,ym,z m},x). (8)
By Claim 9, this is possible only if zm / ∈ Q1(x) for each m. It follows that
{ym} = c({x,ym,z k},x) for each m,k ∈ N,
so part (b) of UHC yields
y ∈ c({x,y,zk},x) for each k ∈ N. (9)
Now, to derive a contradiction, assume y/ ∈ Q1(x). Then, by Claim 9, (9) implies U(y) ≥
U(zk) for each k =1 ,2,....B y t h e ﬁrst part of (8), therefore, U(y) >U (yk) for each
k =1 ,2,.... But since U is continuous, we have limU(yk)=U(y), so there must exist a
strictly increasing sequence (mk) of positive integers such that U(ym1) <U (ym2) < ··· .
Deﬁne T := {x,y,ym1,y m2,...} which is a closed subset of X. Note that if ymk ∈ c(T,x)
for some k, then ymk ∈ c({x,ymk,y mk+1},x) by the α-Axiom, but this contradicts Claim 9.
32Thus ymk / ∈ c(T,x) for each k. Since y ∈ Q2(x), therefore, y ∈ c(T,x). But then, by the
α-Axiom, y ∈ c({x,y,ym1},x). Yet, given that ym1 ∈ Q1(x) and y/ ∈ Q1(x), this contradicts
the representation obtained in Claim 9.
Case 2. ym / ∈ E(x) for inﬁnitely many m.
Passing to a subsequence, if necessary, we may assume in this case that ym ∈ Q1(x)\E(x)
for each m =1 ,2,.... Then, for each m, there exists a zm ∈ E(x)\{x} such that {ym} =
c({x,ym,z m},x). By Claim 9, we have U(ym) >U(zm) for each m. On the other hand, since
X is compact, (zm) has a convergent subsequence — we denote this subsequence again by
(zm), and write z := limzm. F r o mt h ea n a l y s i so fC a s e1 ,w ek n o wt h a tz ∈ Q1(x), while
continuity of U ensures that U(y) ≥ U(z). Suppose there exists a strictly increasing sequence
(mk) of positive integers such that U(ym1) ≥ U(ym2) ≥ ··· . Then, U(ymk) ≥ U(z) for each
k, so
ymk ∈ c({x,ymk,z},x),k =1 ,2,...
Thus, part (b) of UHC yields y ∈ c({x,y,z},x). But since z ∈ Q1(x), Claim 9 shows that
this is possible only if y ∈ Q1(x), as desired. Now suppose we cannot ﬁnd a strictly increasing
sequence (mk) in N such that U(ym1) ≥ U(ym2) ≥ ··· . Then there is an integer M>0 such
that U(yM) <U(yM+1) < ··· . So,
ym ∈ c({x,ym,z M},x) for all m ≥ M,
and hence by part (b) of UHC, y ∈ c({x,y,zM},x). Since zM ∈ Q1(x), Claim 9 then entails
y ∈ Q1(x), as we sought. ¤
Combining Claims 6, 8, 10 and (5), we conclude: For any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X),
c(S,x)= a r gm a x
y∈S∩Q1(x)
U(y),
provided that S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x}. The proof of the “only if” part of Theorem A is thus
complete.
We now turn to the “if” part of Theorem A. Take any continuous map U : X → R and
any closed-valued injective self-correspondences Q1 and Q2 on X such that
LU(x) ∩ Q
1(x)={x} = LU(x) ∩ Q
2(x) and Q
1(x) ⊆ Q2(x)
33for every x ∈ X. Next, deﬁne c : C(X) → 2X as stated in Theorem A. Given that Q1
and Q2 are closed-valued, and U is continuous, c(S,x) is easily checked to be a nonempty
closed subset of S for any S ∈ ΩX. Thus c is a choice correspondence on C(X). It is also
straightforward to verify that c satisﬁes the α-, β-a n dβ
∗-Axioms, so to conclude that c is
rational, it is enough to show that it satisﬁes UHC.
That c satisﬁes part (a) of UHC is an almost immediate consequence of the Berge Max-
imum Theorem. To prove part (b) of UHC, take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) and any sequence
(ym) in X such that ym ∈ c(S ∪ {ym},x) for each m, and ym → y for some y ∈ X. We
wish to show that y ∈ c(S ∪ {y},x). Of course, this is trivially true if ym = x for inﬁnitely
many m, for then S = {x} and y = x. We thus focus on the case where ym 6= x for each
m. Assume next that ym ∈ Q1(x)\{x} for inﬁnitely many m. Then, since Q1(x) is a closed
subset of X, we have y ∈ Q1(x). Moreover, there is a subsequence (ymk) of (ym) such that
U(ymk) ≥ maxU(S ∩ Q1(x)). By continuity of U, then, U(y) ≥ maxU(S ∩ Q1(x)), and
it follows that y ∈ c(S ∪ {y},x), as we sought. Now suppose ym ∈ Q1(x)\{x} for only
ﬁnitely many m. Then, it is without loss of generality to posit that ym ∈ Q2(x)\Q1(x)
for each m. In this case, because ym ∈ c(S ∪ {ym},x), we have S ∩ Q1(x)={x} and
U(ym) ≥ maxU(S ∩Q2(x)),m=1 ,2,.... It follows that y ∈ Q2(x) (because Q2(x) is closed
in X)a n dU(y) ≥ maxU(S ∩Q2(x)) (because U is continuous). Thus, y ∈ c(S ∪{y},x), as
desired.
We now know that c is a rational choice correspondence on C(X). It is also evident that
c satisﬁes WSQB. To prove that it also satisﬁes D, take any S ∈ ΩX and (T,x) ∈ Csq(X)
such that y ∈ c(S,♦) and {y} = c(T,x), and assume that there is a z ∈ T\{x} which is
c-essential in reference to x. By deﬁnition, then, we have
U(w) >U(z) and {z} = c({x,w,z},x)
for some w ∈ X which is c-superior to x.( N o t i c e t h a t U(w) >U (z) ≥ U(x), so w ∈
Q2(x)\{x}). The representation of c entails that this is possible only if z ∈ Q1(x)\{x}.
Since z ∈ T and y ∈ c(T,x), therefore, y ∈ Q1(x). But U(y) ≥ maxU(S), and hence
y ∈ c(S,x), establishing that c satisﬁes D.
It remains to show that c satisﬁes SQI. To this end, take any (S,x) ∈ Csq(X) such that S
is c-superior to x, which means S ⊆ Q2(x), and assume that every y ∈ S\{x} is c-inessential
in reference to x. Let y ∈ c(S,x). To derive a contradiction, suppose U(z) >U (y) for
34some z ∈ S. Since S ⊆ Q2(x), we have z ∈ Q2(x). Since y ∈ c(S,x), then, we must have
z ∈ Q2(x)\Q1(x) and y ∈ Q1(x)\{x}. So {y} = c({x,y,z},x). But this means that y is
c-essential in reference to x, a contradiction. Conclusion:
c(S,x) ⊆ argmax
y∈S
U(y)=c(S,♦).
Conversely, let z ∈ c(S,♦), but assume that z/ ∈ c(S,x). This is possible only if z/ ∈ Q1(x).
Now pick any y ∈ c(S,x), and notice that we must have y ∈ Q1(x) b yt h en a t u r eo ft h e
representation of c. It follows that U(z) ≥ U(y) while {y} = c({x,y,z},x). But this means
that y is c-essential, a contradiction. Conclusion: c(S,♦) ⊆ c(S,x). This establishes that c
satisﬁes SQI.
The proof of Theorem A is now complete.
8.2 Proof of Theorem B
Given Theorem A, the “if” part of Theorem B is fairly straightforward, so we solely concen-
trate on the “only if” part of the latter result. Let c be a rational choice correspondence on
C(X) that satisﬁe sW S Q B ,D ,S Q Ia n dT R E .D e ﬁne the map U and self-correspondences E,
Q1 and Q2 as in the proof of Theorem A. The implications of TRE on the behavior of Q1
and Q2 are discerned in the following claim.
Claim 11. Q1 ◦ Q1 ⊆ Q1 and Q2 ◦ Q2 ⊆ Q2.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 1 .Take any x,y,z ∈ X with y ∈ Q1(x) and z ∈ Q1(y). We wish to show
that z ∈ Q1(x). We may assume that x, y and z are distinct, otherwise z ∈ Q1(x) obtains
trivially. Then y ∈ Q1(x)\{x} and z ∈ Q1(y)\{y}, so by Claim 9, we have {y} = c({x,y},x)
and {z} = c({y,z},y). Now, if y ∈ Q1(x)\E(x), then, by deﬁnition of Q1(x), there must
exist a w1 ∈ E(x)\{x} such that {y} = c({x,y,w1},x). Similarly, if z ∈ Q1(y)\E(y), then,
there exists a w2 ∈ E(y)\{y} such that {z} = c({x,z,w2},y). Deﬁne
ω1 :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
y, if y ∈ E(x)
w1, otherwise
and ω2 :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
z, if z ∈ E(y)
w2, otherwise
,
and let S := {x,y,ω1} and T := {y,z,ω2}. Then, {y} = c(S,x) and {z} = c(T,y), while
S ∩ E(x) 6= {x} and T ∩ E(y) 6= {y}. Therefore, by TRE, we have z ∈ c(S ∪ {z},x). Since
S ∩ Q1(x) 6= {x} (for x 6= y ∈ S ∩ Q1(x)), Claim 9 entails that z ∈ Q1(x), as we sought.
35Next, take any x,y,z ∈ X with y ∈ Q2(x) and z ∈ Q2(y). We wish to show that
z ∈ Q2(x). Again, we may assume that x, y and z are distinct, otherwise z ∈ Q2(x) obtains
trivially. Then y ∈ Q2(x)\{x} and z ∈ Q2(y)\{y}, so given that LU(x) ∩ Q2(x)={x} and
LU(y) ∩ Q2(y)={y}, we have U(z) >U (y) >U (x). The representation of c then implies
{y} = c({x,y},x) and {z} = c({y,z},y). In turn, TRE ensures that z ∈ c({x,z},x), so
z ∈ Q2(x). ¤
Now deﬁne the binary relation D2 on X as follows:
y D
2 x if and only if y ∈ Q
2(x).
Since Q2 is injective and x ∈ Q2(x) for each x ∈ X, D2 is antisymmetric and reﬂexive.
Moreover, Claim 11 implies that it is transitive, so we conclude that D2 is a partial order on
X. Let N denote the set of all linear orders on X that include D2. It is a trivial matter to
show that N 6= ∅ and D2=
T
N. Of course, since X is a ﬁnite set, N is a ﬁnite set as well.
Moreover, each linear order in N can be represented by means of a real map on X. Therefore,
letting n := |N|, we see that there are n maps ui : X → R,i=1 ,...,n, such that y D2 x
iﬀ ui(y) ≥ ui(x) for each i =1 ,...,n. Deﬁning u : X → Rn by u(ω): =( u1(ω),...,un(ω)),
then, we have y D2 x iﬀ u(y) ≥ u(x), for any x,y ∈ X. Noting that each ui, and hence u, is
injective, we have
Q
2(x)=Uu(x) ∪ {x},x ∈ X.
By an analogous reasoning, we ﬁnd a positive integer m and injection v : X → Rm such
that
Q
1(x)=Uv(x) ∪ {x},x ∈ X.
Since Q1(x) ⊆ Q2(x) for each x ∈ X, the statement v(y) ≥ v(x) implies u(y) ≥ u(x), for
any x,y ∈ X. We may then write
Q
1(x)=U(u,v)(x) ∪ {x},x ∈ X.
Finally, let A := {(u(x),v(x)) : x ∈ X}, and deﬁne f : A → R by f(a): =U((u,v)−1(a)).
Finally, we extend f to Rm+n a r b i t r a r i l y ,s a y ,b ys e t t i n gf(b): =0for all b ∈ Rm+n\A. It is
now a trivial matter to check that the representation of c obtained in Theorem A reduces
to that asserted in Theorem B.
368.3 Proof of Proposition C
Take any x ∈ X with Uc(x) < ∞. Suppose x is an accumulation point of Q2(x). Then, by
deﬁnition, there is a sequence (ym) in Q2(x)\{x} such that ym → x. Evidently, x 6= ym ∈
c({x,ym},x), so the deﬁnition of Uc entails U(ym) ≥ Uc(x),m=1 ,2,....B yc o n t i n u i t yo fU,
therefore, U(x) ≥ Uc(x). On the other hand, it follows from the deﬁnition of Uc that there
is a sequence (zm) in X such that x 6= zm ∈ c({x,zm},x) for each m, and U(zm) → Uc(x).
But then U(zm) ≥ U(x),m=1 ,2,..., by deﬁnition of c, so Uc(x) ≥ U(x) by continuity of
U. We conclude that Uc(x)=U(x), as desired.
Conversely, assume that Uc(x)=U(x). Then, by deﬁnition of Uc, there exists a sequence
(zm) in X such that x 6= zm ∈ c({x,zm},x) for each m, and U(zm) → U(x). Since X is a
compact metric space, (zm) must have a subsequence, say (zmk), that converges to some
z ∈ X. Since zmk ∈ Q2(x) for each k, and Q2(x) is a closed subset of X, we have z ∈ Q2(x).
Moreover, U(z) = limU(zmk)=U(x) by continuity of U. It follows that z ∈ LU(x)∩Q2(x)=
{x}, that is, z = x. We conclude that (zmk) is a sequence in Q2(x)\{x} that converges to x,
that is, x is an accumulation point of Q2(x).
8.4 Proof of Proposition D
Take any x ∈ X with Uc(x) > −∞, and deﬁne S(x): ={y ∈ X : y 6= x ∈ c({x,y},y)}.
Since Uc(x) > −∞, we have S(x) 6= ∅. Moreover, the deﬁnition of Uc and the fact that
LU(y)∩Q2(y)={y} for all y ∈ S(x), imply that U(x) ≥ Uc(x). To prove the converse, we ﬁx
an arbitrary z ∈ S(x). Since x ∈ Q2(z) and x ∈ Q2(x), the convexity of the correspondence
Q2 entails that x ∈ Q2((1− 1
m)x+ 1
mz), that is, (1− 1
m)x+ 1
mz ∈ S(x), for each m =1 ,2,....
This shows that x is an accumulation point of S(x), so
Uc(x)=s u p {U(y):y ∈ S(x)} ≥ U(x).
We conclude that U(x)=Uc(x), a sw a st ob ep r o v e d .
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